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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

JUDICIAL SELF-LIMITATION IN ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW: EXAMPLES IN TARIFF ADMINISTRATIONt
By RALPH H. DWAN* and EVERETT E. SMITr**

A

RECENT CASE in the Supreme Court of the United States,

United States v. Bush & Co.,1 brings to the foreground again
the problem of judicial review of administrative action in certain
2
types of tariff matters.
In the Bush Case the court was concerned with action taken
by the president and the Tariff Commission pursuant to the provisions of sec. 336 of the Tariff Act of 1930. 3 That section, the
so-called "flexible tariff provision," authorizes the president upon
the recommendation of the United States Tariff Commission to
raise or lower the rate of duties and to change the basis of valuation of imported merchandise in order thereby to equalize the differences in the costs of production of foreign and domestic merchandise of a similar nature.
In pursuance of its duty under that section the Tariff Commission had investigated the cost of production of canned clams
produced in Japan for the period from December 1, 1930 to September 30, 1932, which costs were expressed in terms of the
Japanese yen. In converting the costs of production into the
currency of the United States for comparison with domestic costs,
the commission had used the average rate of exchange for 1932.
*Member of the Minnesota bar, the bar of the United States Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals, and the bar of the Supreme Court of the
United States; Chief Counsel, Bureau of Customs, Treasury Department
of the United States.
**Member of the Minnesota bar and the bar of the United States Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals; attorney, Bureau of Customs, Treasury
Department of the United States.
tThe statements made in this article represent only the personal views
of the authors; they do not in any way reflect the official views of any
government department or officer.
1(1940) 310 U. S. 371, 60 Sup. Ct. 944, 84 L. Ed. 1259, T. D. 50159.
2This article is not concerned with the ordinary customs or tariff
litigation involving the value, quantity or rate of duty on imported merchandise. There is ample judicial review of such matters by the United
States customs court and, on appeal, by the United States court of customs
and patent appeals. See, in this connection, secs. 501, 514, and 515 of the
Tdriff Act of 1930, 46 Stat. at L. 730 et seq., 19 U. S. C. A. secs. 1501,
1514, and 1515); sec. 198 of the Judicial Code (28 U.S.C.A. sec. 310).
Provision is also made for review by the Supreme Court "by certiorari or
otherwise." Sec. 195 of the Judicial Code, as amended (28 U.S.C.A. sec.
308).
346 Stat. at L. 701, 19 U. S. C. A. sec. 1336.
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The change in the basis of valuation recommended by the commission as a result of its study was approved and proclaimed by
the president. As the change in the basis of valuation had the
effect of increasing the duties on the canned clams imported by
him subsequent to the effective date of the proclamation, an importer instituted proceedings to obtain an appraisement on the
basis of valuation in effect prior to the president's proclamation.
The United States Customs Court denied relief. On appeal,
the United States court of customs and patent appeals held that
it was error to convert costs or prices for one period into United
States dollars at the average rate of exchange for another period,
the statutory section being silent as to the precise method of conversion to be used. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment
of the court below, holding that the statute permitted executive
discretion in"selecting the conversion rate and that the judgment of
the president as to the existence of facts warranting a change in
the basis of valuation was determinative. Mr. Justice Douglas
speaking for the court (Mr. Justice McReynolds dissenting)
said :'
"The determination of foreign exchange value was prescribed,
in the procedure outlined by Congress, neither for the action of
the commission nor for that of the president. There is no express provision in the Act that the rate of exchange must be
taken for the same period as the invoice prices. To imply it would
be to add what Congress has omitted and doubtless omitted in
view of the very nature of the problem. The matter was left
at large. The president's method of solving the problem was open
to scrutiny neither by the court of customs and patent appeals
nor by us. Whatever may be the scope of appellate jurisdiction
conferred by sec. 501 of the Tariff Act of 1930, it certainly does
not permit judicial examination of the judgment of the president
that the rates of duty recommended by the commission are necessary to equalize the differences in the domestic and foreign costs
of production.
And the judgment of the president that on the facts,
adduced in pursuance of the procedure prescribed by Congress, a
change of rate is necessary is no more subject to judicial review
under this statutory scheme than if Congress itself had exercised
that judgment. It has long been held that where Congress has
authorized a public officer to take some specified legislative action
when in his judgment that action is necessary or appropriate to
carry out the policy of Congress, the judgment of the officer as to
4At page 378, et seq. Italics supplied and footnotes omitted.
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the er;istence of the facts calling for that action is not subject to
review."
Those imbued with the idea of judicial omnipotence may be
inclined to treat the Bush Case as in the nature of a sport or
variant peculiar to the flexible tariff. However, it is the principal
purpose of this article to call attention to a little-known line of
cases in another field of administrative law in which the courts
have exercised similar self-restraint. The leading case is Cramer
v. Arthur, decided by the Supreme Court in the October 1880,
term.' In that case the statute directed the director of the Mint
annually to estimate the value of the pure metal of foreign coins of
standard value in circulation in terms of the money of account of
the United States. The secretary of the treasury was directed
to proclaim the estimated values on the first day of January of
each year. The statute further provided that the values so proclaimed should be used by collectors of customs in appropriate
cases in converting the prices and values of goods imported from
foreign countries into United States dollars. Acting pursuant
to those provisions, the director of the Mint had estimated and
the secretary of the treasury had proclaimed the value of the
Austrian silver florin for the year 1874, the year in which the
plaintiff's goods were imported, to be 47.60 cents.
The United States consul stationed in Austria-Hungary, according to the provisions of another statute and the president's
regulations thereunder, furnished the importer, who had actually
purchased his goods in Vienna, Austria, with paper florin instead
of silver florin, with a certificate stating the value of the paper
currency in terms of United States money. The value stated in
the certificate, 45.77 cents, apparently was derived by applying
the percentage of depreciation to the proclaimed value of the
silver florin.
In translating the value of the imported merchandise as expressed in the invoice, the collector of customs adopted the value
of the paper florin which had been certified by the United States
consul. The importer protested against the collector's action, and
on the trial produced evidence for the purpose of showing that the
silver florin was not in circulation in Austria in 1874, that it had
ceased to be a standard or measure of value early in 1873, and
"that by the official paper or gazette of the stock exchange of
Vienna the silver florin was worth 45.46 cents in American gold
5(1880) 102 U. S. 612, 26 L. Ed. 259.
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coin in September, 1874, and the paper florin, 43.71 cents." On
that evidence, the importer founded his claim "that the amount
of duty should have been assessed at $1,780.67," and that an excess
of $150 had been exacted. The lower court directed a verdict for
the defendant and the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of
the lower court. After stating that the Austrian florin was the
standard money of account of Austria whether or not represented by a corresponding coin and that the secretary's proclama8
tion was as binding "as if it had been in a permanent statute," Mr.
7
Justice Bradley speaking for the court said :"
"The proclamation of the secretary and the certificate of the
consul must be regarded as conclusive. In the estimation of the
value of foreign moneys for the purpose of assessing duties, there
must be an end to controversy somewhere. When Congress fixes
the value by a general statute, parties must abide by that. When
it fixes the value through the agency of official instrumentalities,
devised for the purpose of making a nearer approximation to the
actual state of things, they must abide by the values so ascertained.
If the currency is a standard one, based on coin, the Secretary's
proclamation fixes it; if it is a depreciated currency, the parties
may have the benefit of a consular certificate. To go behind these
and allow an examination by affidavits in every case would put
the assessment of duties at sea. It would create utter confusion
and uncertainty. If existing regulations are found to be insufficient, if they lead to inaccurate results, the only remedy is to
apply to the president, through the Treasury Department, to
change the regulations. From the letter of the secretary exhibited
in this case, we infer that this was afterwards done, and that he
made the desired change. But this change in the regulations does
not affect prior transactions which took place before they went
into effect."
The letter of the secretary of the treasury to which the Court
referred was written a few weeks after the importation of the
goods involved in the case under discussion. It stated, among
other things, as quoted in the Court's opinion, that "the department had authentic information that the silver florin had generally
been thrown out of use, both as a standard and as currency ... "
Accordingly, the collector of customs addressed was directed, in
effect, to disregard the proclaimed value of the silver florin in
determining the value of the paper florin of Austria.
It is hard to reconcile the quoted statement of the secretary
6Compare this language with the italicized portion of the quotation
from the Bush Case, supra pp. 731-732.
7At page 404 of his Bulwark of the Republic (1937) Hendrick refers
to Mr. Justice Bradley as "probably the greatest intellect, considered purely
who ever ornamented the Supreme Bench."
as intellect,
8Cramer v. Arthur, (1880) 102 U. S. 612, 619, 26 L. Ed. 259.
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of the treasury and the Court's statement 9 that "the florin is the
standard money of account of Austria," whether or not "represented by a corresponding coin." Nor is it entirely clear from
the Court's statement whether it considered the florin a standard
coin "in circulation" within the meaning of the statute as a matter
of law. Presumably, the Court meant no more than that the
secretary's finding that the florin was a coin "in circulation" was
conclusive on the courts irrespective of the actual fact. 10
The rationale of the court's position was stated more fully in
Hadden v. Merritt."l In that case an importer of goods from
China claimed that in acting pursuant to the same statute the
secretary of the treasury had proclaimed the value of the foreign
currency, the Mexican dollar, 12 in terms of the silver dollar of
the United States instead of the gold dollar of the United States,
claimed to be the true "money of account of the United States"
in 1879, the year of importation. It was also claimed that if the
secretary of the treasury had expressed the value of the foreign
currency in terms of the gold dollar, the collector's assessment
of duty would have been on a lower valuation in the money of
account of the United States. The Supreme Court dismissed the
importer's arguments in the following language :13
GCramer
v. Arthur, (1880) 102 U. S. 612, 616, 26 L. Ed. 259.
' 0 The Supreme Court's position has been so interpreted by a lower
court. In Amalgamated Textiles, Ltd. v. United States, (1936) 24 Ct.
Cust. & Pat Appls. (Customs) 74, 84 F. (2d) 210, 69 Treas. Dec. 1053,
T. D. 48378, which arose under the tariff act now in effect, the court said
(at page 81) : "The parallel between the above-cited case and the case at
bar is evident. There it was established as a fact that the silver florin,
named in the proclamation of the secretary of the treasury as the standard
in Austria, was not in circulation at the time of the importation of the
merchandise there involved. A like claim is here made, that the equivalent
of the pound sterling in gold was not in circulation in Great Britain at the
time of the importation of the merchandise here involved. The Supreme
Court in the Cramer Case declined to go behind the proclamation of the
secretary of the treasury and inquire into the facts upon which his proclamation was based, and for the same reasons as given by the Supreme Court
for so declining, we must decline to inquire into the facts upon which the
secretary of the treasury based his proclamation involved in the case at bar."
11(1885) 115 U. S. 25, 5 Sup. Ct. 1169, 29 L. Ed. 333.
12"Various other foreign dollars entered China during the nineteenth
century, chief of which was the Mexican dollar, which was introduced
into China about 1850-1860. . . . Various attempts were made from time
to time to suppress the circulation of foreign coins in China. The Mexican
dollar, however, as well as the Hongkong and Straits dollars, has continued to circulate in China up to the present time, so that in Shanghai
today the term 'Mex' is practically synonymous with the term 'silver
dollar'." Currency, Banking and Finance in China, Trade Promotion Series
No. 27 of the United States Department of Commerce (1926), at pages
18 and 19.
I'Hadden v. Merritt, (1885) 115 U. S. 25, 27, 5 Sup. Ct. 1169, 29
L. Ed. 333.
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"The value of foreign coins, as ascertained by the estimate of
the director of the mint and proclaimed by the secretary of the
treasury, is conclusive upon custom-house officers and importers.
No errors alleged to exist in the estimate, resulting from any
cause, can be shown in a judicial proceeding, to affect the rights
of the government or individuals. There is no value, and can
be none, in such coins, except as thus ascertained; and the duty
of ascertaining and declaring their value, cast upon the Treasury
Department, is the performance of an executive function, requiring skill and the exercise of judgment and discretion, which precludes judicial inquiry into the correctness of the decision. If
any error, in adopting a wrong standard, rule, or mode of computation, or in any other way, is alleged to have been committed,
there is but one method of correction. That is to appeal to the
department itself. To permit judicial inquiry in any case is to
open a matter for repeated decision, which the statute evidently
intended should be annually settled by public authority; and
there is not, as is assumed in the argument of the plaintiff in
error, any such positive and peremptory rule of valuation prescribed in the statute, as serves to limit the discretion of the
Treasury Department in making its published estimate, or would
enable a court to correct an alleged mistake or miscalculation.
The whole subject is confided by the law exclusively to the jurisdiction of the executive officers charged with the duty; and their
action cannot be otherwise questioned."
Those pioneer cases have been followed consistently, under
varying circumstances, by the Supreme Court1 4 itself and have
been similarly applied by the lower courts having jurisdiction, 15
including cases decided under the Tariff Act of 1930, which is
now in operation.
The situation confronting the court of customs and patent
appeals in J. S. Staedtler, Inc. v. United States' bears an interesting relation to that involved in Hadden v. Merritt. The importer again claimed that the secretary had incorrectly construed
the expression "the money of account of the United States."
This time, it was asserted, the secretary had stated the value of
the foreign coin, the German Reichsmark, in terms of gold. It
24 Klingenberg v. United States, (1894) 153 U. S. 93, 14 Sup. Ct. 790,
38 L. Ed. 647, and United States v. Whitridge, (1905) 197 U. S. 135, 25
Sup. Ct. 406, 49 L. Ed. 696.
1'Klumpp v. Thomas, (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1908) 162 Fed. 853, certiorari
denied, (1908) 212 U. S. 579, 29 Sup. Ct. 688, 53 L. Ed. 659; J. K. Clarke v.
United States, (1930) 17 Ct. Cust. & Pat. Appls. (Customs) 420, 57 Treas.
Dec. 289, T. D. 43866; Amalgamated Textiles, Ltd. v. United States, supra,
n. 10; J. S. Staedtler, Inc. v. United States, (1937) 25 Ct Cust. & Pat.
Appls. (Customs) 136, 72 Treas. Dec. 604, T. D- 49255.
16(1937) 25 Ct. Cust. & Pat. Appls. (Customs) 136, 72 Treas. Dec
604, T. D. 49255.
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was further asserted that gold was not the money of account of
the United States, in view of the Joint Resolution of June 5, 1933,
invalidating clauses purporting to give the obligees of contracts
17
for the payment of money the right to require payment in gold.
The court was not beguiled by the intricacies of the argument.
It upheld the proclamation, resting its decision squarely on the
ground that the opinion in Hadden v. Merritt was authority for
the proposition that the proclamation of the secretary of the
treasury, being regular on its face, is determinative that the
values in question are expressed in terms of the money of account of the United States.
The cases last discussed have all involved the finality or conclusiveness of an administrative or executive finding of the mintpar value of foreign coins.18 The same degree of finality has
been held to pertain to a similar finding of foreign exchange
value.
The Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. Whitridge,9
although perhaps not directly in point, is of interest in this connection. In that case the foreign currency, the Indian silver
rupee, bore a legal ratio to the English gold pound of fifteen to
one. Its value as one-fifteenth of a gold pound exceeded the
value of its silver content but corresponded to its exchange value.
The Court apparently thought that the secretary of the treasury had authority to consider foreign exchange value (which point
had been disputed by the importer) under a proviso which was
added to the law involved in the Cramer Case and Hadden v.
Merritt in 1894 and which was in effect repealed in 1921.20 As
the accuracy of the finding of foreign exchange value was not
disputed there was no occasion for sustaining its conclusiveness
in this respect. The Court did point out, however, that the
secretary's finding may have related to the mint-par value of the
rupee as one-fifteenth of a gold pound and if so was conclusive.
In brief, as Mr. Justice Holmes expressed it :21
1748 Stat. at L. 112; 31 U. S. C. A. see. 463.
IsThe Cramer Case, of course, also sustained the finality of the
consular officer's finding of the relative values of two currencies of the
same foreign country, the Austrian paper florin and the Austrian silver
florin. The determination of the market ratio of two domestic currencies
would seem to require essentially the same type of skill and judgment as
the determination of the relationship between a foreign and a domestic
currency.
19(1905)
197 U. S. 135, 25 Sup. Ct. 406, 49 L. Ed. 696.
20
Section 403 of the Act of May 27, 1921, 42 Stat. at L. 17.
21(1905) 197 U. S. 135, 144, 25 Sup. Ct. 406, 49 L. Ed. 696.
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"But, as in this case the exchange value and the value as a
fraction of a pound were the same, it does not matter to our
decision whether we say that in such circumstances the action of
the secretary was conclusive or say that it was right."
The lower courts, however, have held clearly that the secretary of the treasury's findings of foreign exchange value are conclusive upon them.2 2 In so doing they have cited and relied upon
the decisions in the Cramer Case and Hadden v. Merritt. In the
words of the court in J. K. Clarke v. United States,23 the judicial
review of such findings "is limited to determining simply whether
the order made is by its terms in conformity with the statute ... "
As the order involved in that case purported to show the foreign
exchange value of the rupee "in United States money," the court
refused to consider the claim that the value really represented
the value in India rather than the value in the United States.
The similarities between the Bush Case and the earlier cases
just discussed, the Cramer Case for example, are evident. 2 4 In
both cases mentioned, the administrative agency involved was
performing a function previously performed by Congress. 25 In
both cases the Court observed that the action taken pursuant to
the congressional delegation was no more subject to judicial review than if performed by Congress itself.
There are important differences in the cases, however. The
value of a foreign currency is only incidentally involved in the
Bush Case; it is primarily involved in the other cases. In Hadden
22
1(Ilumpp v. Thomas, (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1908) 162 Fed. 853; J. K.

Clarke v. United States, (1930) 17 Ct. Cust. & Pat. Appls. (Customs) 420,
57 Treas. Dec. 289, T. D. 43866.
23(1930) 17 Ct. Cust. & Pat. Appls. (Customs) 420, 57 Treas. Dec. 289,
T. D.
24 43866.
Compare Franklin Sugar Refining Co. v. United States, (1911) 1
Ct. Cust. Appls. 242, 20 Treas. Dec. 236, T. D. 31276, holding that the
finding of the secretary of the treasury of the aiount of a foreign bounty
upon production or exportation to be offset by countervailing duties is
conclusive upon the courts. To be contrasted is the recent decision of the
court of customs and patent appeals in F. W. Woolworth Co. v. United
States, (Ct. Cust. & Pat Appls. 1940) 115 F. (2d) 348, Cust. Appls.
Decisions 151, which involved the existence of a grant or bounty in the
German currency and trade practices, rather than the amount of the
declared grant or bounty; the court, without discussion of the point, assumed
its competence to review.
25
The history of congressional action in respect of the value of foreign
currencies for the purpose of converting invoice and market values expressed therein into money of account of the United States, and for other
purposes as well, is set forth in the statement of the case in Collector v.
Richards, (1874) 23 Wall. (U.S.) 246, 23 L. Ed. 95. The relevant portion of the statement is the opinion of the lower court in the case, which
the Reporter considered "so curious and interesting" a document as to be
"worthy of preservation in this place." P. 249.
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v. Merritt, the Court refers to the determination of such value
as an "executive function." In view of the nature of the function, the Court believed that Congress wished the agency employed
by it, the Congress, to have, so far as the courts are concerned,
considerable latitude not only in finding facts as such but in
reaching conclusions involving mixed fact and law. Thus, in
Hadden v. Merritt the Court thought the secretary of the
treasury had been authorized to determine, for the purposes involved in that case, whether or not the United States silver dollar
could be considered the money of account of the United States.
In neither type of cases is there any apparent constitutional
limitation on the finality which may be ascribed to the administrative finding. In the Bush Case the Court quoted its statement in
Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States :28 "No one
has a legal right to the maintenance of an existing rate of duty."
By a parity of reasoning, there would seem to be no legal right
to a particular value of a foreign coin for customs purposes of
the kind in question. Or, as the Court said in Hadden v. Merritt,
in a passage previously quoted, "There is no value, and can be
none, in such coins, except as thus ascertained .. "
Although it is not within the scope of this article to attempt
to fit the cases discussed into the general picture of judicial
review of administrative action, one observation may be made.
Dean Landis27 has pointed out that many of the cases on judicial
review do not correspond very well with practical judgments as
to the desirability of court intervention and has indicated that
practical considerations, when present, are sometimes only implicit in the judicial opinions. In that connection the intensely
practical reasoning explicit in Cramer v. Arthur and the cases
following it is rather refreshing.
20(1933)
288 U. S. 294, 318, 53 Sup. Ct. 350, 77 L. Ed. 796.
2
7Landis, The Administrative Process (1938) 132-133.

